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WHO’S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD TAXFREE LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTION?
IDEOLOGICAL DEBATES ON
TAXATION AND THE REPEAL OF
GENERAL UTILITIES
MARTIN EDWARDS*
I
INTRODUCTION
1

The General Utilities doctrine, named for the 1935 Supreme Court decision
allowing a corporation to distribute appreciated assets to shareholders without
reporting a taxable gain, was once known as one of seven fundamental
2
principles of American corporate taxation. The doctrine’s popularity reached
its peak in 1954, when Congress formally incorporated it into the Internal
3
Revenue Code. Despite this esteemed position among tax-law doctrines,
General Utilities was routinely criticized because, among other things, it allowed
a situational (and arbitrary) reprieve from “double taxation” of corporate
4
5
income. Corporate income is functionally taxed twice in the sense that the
corporation owes tax on the profits earned by its operations and the
shareholders owe individual income taxes on the leftover, after-tax profits the
corporation distributes to shareholders. The General Utilities doctrine reflects a
tension that has existed throughout tax law history—that is, whether double
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endless readings of this note, and, of course, for love and support.
1. General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
2. Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and
Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90, 130 (1977).
3. See Cheryl D. Block, Liquidations Before and After Repeal of General Utilities, 21 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 307, 313 n.33 (1984) (arguing that Congress clearly intended to codify General Utilities in the
1954 revision of the Internal Revenue Code).
4. Lily Kahng, Resurrecting the General Utilities Doctrine, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (1998).
5. “Corporate” and “corporation” primarily refer to corporations organized under Subchapter C
or S of the Internal Revenue Code. Subchapter-C corporations will be referred to as “C-corporations.”
These are types of entities that are incorporated and actually exist apart from their owners.
Clarifications regarding the nature of incorporated entities vis-à-vis non–incorporated entities will be
noted as necessary.
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6

taxation of corporate income is good policy.
Over the years, many scholars and tax experts have expressed the view that
two-level taxation of certain corporate entities is appropriate, while businesses
and their tax counsel have routinely lobbied for and devised ways around this
now-enduring feature of corporate taxation. This tension between a true twotax regime and an “integrated” system in which only shareholders are taxed was
one of the issues at the heart of the debate surrounding repeal of General
7
Utilities. Proponents of separating corporate and shareholder income see
General Utilities as arbitrary and unreasonably advantageous for corporations.
Those who believe that the fictional corporate person should not be taxable
view General Utilities as a framework to integrate corporate income. General
Utilities, then, was a blessing to tax attorneys and a predicament for the tax
collector.
Both Congress and the Court attempted to balance this longstanding tension
by formulating, reformulating, and grafting complex exceptions onto the
8
doctrine. As the doctrine got more complicated, many in the academy became
convinced that General Utilities was a purely dogmatic convention with no
9
logical justification. However, those who believed that corporate double
taxation was not sound policy in every respect saw General Utilities as far from
10
unfairly advantageous for corporations. There is no explanation in the General
Utilities case, the Treasury regulations that might be considered the doctrine’s
origin, or any subsequent act of the Court or Congress why a transaction that
resembles a sale of an appreciated asset would not trigger tax liability for the
realized appreciation. On the other hand, the shareholders, and not the
corporation, were the taxpayers who were formally and literally selling the
shares. And, moreover, dividends in kind were not traditionally considered
11
taxable events for the corporation. Nonetheless, by the mid-1980s, the clamor
for reform or repeal of General Utilities had reached a fever pitch, and in 1986
Congress entombed the formerly glorious precept of American tax law, thus
12
extending the principle of double taxation and also simplifying the tax
treatment of distributions of corporate assets.

6. See generally Steven A. Bank, The Rise and Fall of Post–World War II Corporate Tax Reform,
73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207 (Winter 2010) (describing the double taxation of corporate income
through the lens of post–World War II tax-reform efforts, culminating with the dividend provisions in
the Bush Tax Cuts in 2003).
7. Block, supra note 3, at 333.
8. Id. at 324.
9. Bernard Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of
the General Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 81, 81 (1985).
10. See Richard C.E. Beck, Distributions In Kind in Corporate Liquidations: A Defense of General
Utilities, 38 TAX LAW. 663, 670 (1985) (arguing that the General Utilities doctrine was not necessarily
an unfair advantage for corporations).
11. Id.
12. David Shores, Repeal of General Utilities and the Triple Taxation of Corporate Income, 46
TAX L. 177, 177 (1992).
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It has been over twenty-five years since General Utilities met its end. At the
time, its repeal was considered, for better or worse, a “sea change” in American
13
14
tax law. No longer could liquidating corporations distribute assets to
shareholders and transfer them tax free. In addition, managing tax liabilities on
15
various types of assets became simpler: all were taxed. In the intervening
years, most who were originally in favor of the doctrine’s repeal were likely
untroubled by its absence. A smaller group of scholars and a few tax
16
professionals, though, were not so sure. Some of the ill effects supposedly
vanquished by the doctrine’s repeal were replaced with others. It is possible that
Congress will undertake a major tax reform again in the near future. If it does,
double taxation of corporate income might well be a significant point of debate.
At a comfortable distance of a quarter century, a thorough examination of the
history surrounding General Utilities, the debates at the time of repeal, and the
policy tensions that underpinned those debates will show that General Utilities’
repeal was a major turning point in American tax law history and may provide
some new insights as policymakers once again consider taking up the mantle of
tax reform.
II
GENERAL UTILITIES’ PLACE IN TAX-LAW HISTORY
A. The History of Double Taxation of Corporate Income
One of the more controversial features of the U.S. federal income tax is that
17
certain income is taxed at both the corporate level and the shareholder level.
For example, suppose a corporation earns a profit of $1,000,000 from its
operations. As a corporation, a legal entity apart from its owners, it would then
18
pay tax on that income, say $300,000. This leaves $700,000 in the corporate
treasury, some of which, say $400,000, it will distribute to its owners as
dividends. Those dividends, then, are income of the owners who receive them.
Because the owners are individuals who also pay tax on their income, the

13. ROBERT W. WOOD, GENERAL UTILITIES REDUX? M&A TAX REPORT 8 (2009), available at
http://woodporter.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/General_Utilities_Redux.pdf.
14. Liquidation is functionally the only circumstance in which a corporation could avail itself of
General Utilities by the time it was repealed. See I.R.C. § 336 (1984) (allowing nonrecognition of gain in
complete liquidation).
15. However, given the number of relief provisions and other rules for mitigating the troubles
caused by repeal, some have argued that this issue has become more complicated. See Beck, supra note
10, at 663 (describing various relief provisions proposed prior to repeal).
16. See, e.g., Kahng, supra note 4, at 1087; Louis F. Lobenhofer, The Repeal of General Utilities
for Corporate Liquidations — The Consequences of Incomplete and Unexpected Tax Reform, 4 AKRON
TAX J. 153 (1987).
17. This feature of U.S. tax law is considerably different from other tax systems around the world.
Bank, supra note 6, at 207.
18. This figure is for illustrative purposes only and does not necessarily reflect what a corporation
with $1,000,000 of taxable income might currently pay in taxes.
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money they receive as a dividend must also be taxed. Therefore, of the same
$400,000 in distributed corporate profits, the Internal Revenue Service collects
a share at the corporation level as a percentage of the corporation’s reported
income and at the individual level as a percentage of that shareholder’s
personal income. Hence, what is essentially the same income, in the sense that it
was really only earned or created once, is taxed two times.
A tax on income is relatively young in the United States. Congress enacted
20
the first permanent tax on corporate and individual income in 1894, but the
21
scheme was promptly declared unconstitutional. Roughly fifteen years later,
Congress decided to institute an excise tax for doing business as a corporation,
22
the size of that excise being a function of the corporation’s income. Like the
difference between selling an asset directly and distributing it to shareholders
who then subsequently sell it, it is quite difficult to distinguish between an
excise tax for doing business as a corporation based on income and a corporate
23
income tax. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court decided that such an excise was
24
constitutional. Although the excise tax was the basis for taxing corporations,
there was no income tax on individuals in 1909. If there is only one tax on
corporate income, two-level taxation does not exist unless one corporation
receives dividends from owning stock in another. Congress was apparently
cognizant of the problem with this outcome, so it allowed a deduction of other
corporations’ dividends from the relevant corporation’s excise calculation to
25
ensure that a corporation’s income would not be taxed twice. In 1913,
Congress passed and the states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment, which
overrode the Supreme Court’s declaration that an income tax was
unconstitutional. Since then, Congress has had constitutional authority to tax
26
the incomes of both corporations and individuals.
At first, both corporate income-tax rates and individual rates were 1% on all
27
income under $20,000. Individuals, and not corporations, whose income
19. Currently, dividend income is treated separately from ordinary wage income, but that has not
always been the case. Prior to 2003, dividend income was ordinary income and will be again if the Bush
Tax Cuts are not extended. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-27, §§ 302–303, 117 Stat. 752, 760–64 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
20. During the Civil War, Congress authorized an income tax to fund war efforts but allowed it to
expire in 1872. See Gary Giroux, Financing the American Civil War: Developing New Tax Sources, 17
ACCT. HISTORY 83 (2012).
21. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Shores, supra note 12, at 186.
22. Shores, supra note 12, at 187–88.
23. Id. at 188.
24. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
25. Shores, supra note 12, at 188.
26. U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
27. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, §2A(1) 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913). This is roughly
$450,000 in 2010 dollars, using the Consumer Price Index as the rate of inflation. See CPI Inflation
Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited
Jan. 25, 2014) (enter 20000 in “$” field; then select 1913 as the base year and 2010 as the equivalent
year).
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exceeded $20,000 were required to pay a graduated tax of 2%–6% on any
28
income above $20,000. And, just like it had prevented double taxation for
corporations who received the dividends of other corporations, Congress
29
exempted dividend income from the net-income calculation. There was one
exception: Those individuals whose total incomes were subject to the graduated
30
tax were required to pay taxes on those dividends that exceeded $20,000. The
reason for this was simple: an individual whose business activities would earn in
excess of $20,000 could incorporate him or herself as a C-corporation, pay 1%
of the corporation’s income in taxes and take all of the remaining income in taxfree dividends. Thus, the double tax on corporate income was designed to deter
taxpayers from opportunistically and arbitrarily avoiding substantial tax solely
31
by choosing to operate as a corporation.
Nonetheless, many prominent tax scholars have described the General
32
Utilities doctrine, a reprieve from double taxation, as dogmatic. They argue
that it makes no sense in light of the “classical, double tax” on corporate
33
income. As the twentieth century marched on, scholars and others began to
accept the double tax as a permanent feature of the tax code, despite the fact
that the early Congresses who confronted double taxation seemed to disfavor
34
it. The justification for the double tax was relatively simple: Because
35
corporations are legally “people,” they are taxed separately from actual
36
people. Viewed this way, it appears that a tax on all income without regard to
37
source could provide for double, triple, or even further multiplied taxation.
28. Id. at 166–67.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Wolfman, supra note 9, at 81 (describing the General Utilities doctrine as
“theological[] . . . like creation, it was there.”).
33. Id. at 86; see also Shores, supra note 12, at 186 n.34 (citing ALI FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C, REPORTER’S STUDY OF THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS
327 (1982)).
34. See Shores, supra note 12, at 177 n.60 (citing ALI FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra
note 33, at 327 (describing and defending the contemporary understanding of double taxation)).
35. The notion of corporate personhood dates back to the mid-1800s. The Supreme Court ruled in
an obscure case, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R., Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), that corporations
were individuals for certain purposes. It arose out of a tax dispute between a California county and a
railroad corporation. Individuals were allowed a certain tax deduction by the county, while
corporations were not. The Supreme Court sided with the railroad corporation, deciding that for these
purposes, corporations had the same rights as individuals. The Court’s controversial 2010 decision in
Citizens’ United v. Federal Election Commission seemed to firmly cement corporate personhood as the
Court decided that corporations have First Amendment rights to free speech. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
36. See Shores, supra note 12, at 185–86 (describing the entity theory of corporate law).
37. Cf. id. To illustrate the multiple-tax principle, imagine a corporation, call it Bitterman.
Bitterman owns stock in another corporation, Acme. Acme distributes some of its income as dividends
to shareholders, including Bitterman. Bitterman earns income, including the dividends from Acme, and
then distributes dividends of its own. Acme is taxed on income it earns, then Bitterman is taxed on the
dividends it earned from Acme stock, and Bitterman shareholders are taxed on dividends distributed
by Bitterman. Therefore, part of the income has been taxed at three levels, unless Congress provides
that dividends are deductible at some level.
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Furthermore, many corporations are large and have vast numbers of individual
and institutional shareholders, making the corporation seem even more distinct
from the random and varied individuals who own it. Certainly, from a revenuecollection standpoint, the more opportunities (or entities) from which taxes may
be extracted, the more potential revenue fills the nation’s coffers. Only
lawmakers, then, could decide whether and at what levels dividends could be
exempted from taxation, and therefore how many levels at which certain
earnings are taxed. The first Congress faced with the prospect of double
taxation apparently felt that this was not appropriate and exempted dividends
from other income earned by taxpayers. Further, just six years after the
constitutional birth of the income tax, Treasury regulations were promulgated
38
making the distribution of dividends and dividends in kind non–taxable events.
Surely, those regulations were on the Court’s mind when it decided General
Utilities.
B. General Utilities Co. v. Helvering
More than fifteen years prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in General
Utilities, but only six years after the birth of the income tax, the Treasury
introduced regulations that essentially declared that various dividend
39
transactions would not be taxable. The treatment of dividend transactions has
always been a struggle for policymakers because there is no easy way to classify
dividends for tax purposes. They are not expenses paid that might be deducted
from income, nor are they expenses on debts owed to creditors. They are simply
an internal transaction in which a corporation releases capital directly into the
hands of shareholders rather than holding it for use within the operations of the
corporation. Either way, the shareholders are still ultimately entitled to the
capital.
General Utilities is a beguilingly simple case. At the time of the events that
gave rise to the case, the General Utilities Corporation owned half of the
outstanding stock of Islands Edison, which it had acquired for the paltry sum of
40
approximately $2000. By the time a buyer approached General Utilities about
purchasing its share of Islands Edison, the market value of the stock had
41
appreciated to more than $1.2 million. From an economic perspective, General
Utilities and the buyer interested in Island Edison could have arranged this
transaction in any number of ways and achieved the ultimate result of the buyer
taking control of Islands Edison by purchasing its stock. But taxes are always
and forever part of any transaction’s economic picture. If General Utilities had
simply sold the stock to the buyer, it would have faced a massive capital-gains
42
tax liability for the appreciation of the Islands Edison stock from $2000 to $1.2
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 39.22 (a)–20 (1953).
Id.
General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 201 (1935).
Id. at 202.
Capital gains refers to the recognition of income from the dispostion of certain types of assets
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million.
Thus, General Utilities arranged the transaction by distributing the stock as
43
a dividend in kind. In doing so, General Utilities shareholders would owe
individual income taxes on the value they received from the corporation as a
dividend, which was the market value of their portion of the distributed stock at
the time of the distribution. A fundamental principle of both tax and accounting
is that whenever any entity acquires an asset, the asset must be recorded at the
price paid or fair market value. This value is called its “basis” for tax purposes.
In the case of a dividend in kind, the basis of the property distributed as a
dividend is “stepped up” to fair market value at the time of the distribution.
Therefore, the stepped-up basis of the Islands Edison stock resulting from the
dividend distribution eliminated the massive taxable capital gain that would
44
have been attributed to General Utilities. Given the way this transaction was
structured, General Utilities had avoided taxation on the capital gain allocable
to the Islands’ Edison stock, though the shareholders still had to pay taxes on
the stock they received. However, they did not pay tax on the subsequent sale.
If General Utilities had sold the stock, it would have owed taxes on the gain.
Then, if it distributed any of the cash from the sale, the shareholders would owe
taxes on whatever they received as well.
Following the transaction, the commissioner of the Internal Revenue
Service brought an action in tax court against General Utilities to recover the
tax that would have been owed on the appreciation of the Islands Edison
45
stock. The commissioner’s only argument in the tax court was that
46
distributions in kind are taxable as gains to the distributing corporation. The
47
Treasury itself disfavored this view, at least in the context of liquidation.
However, General Utilities was not liquidating at the time it divested itself of
Islands Edison. The commissioner failed to make the argument that would
serve as a centerpiece to the arguments for repeal and that would later be
48
accepted by the Court in another case: that an arranged, postdistribution sale
of an appreciated asset by a corporation’s shareholders is functionally a sale by
49
the corporation, on which the corporation should pay taxes. Indeed, the court
of appeals sided with the commissioner against General Utilities on this very

that is treated differently from the recognition of general income under § 61 of the Internal Revenue
Code.
43. “In kind” simply means that the dividend is paid in some form other than cash. In this case, the
dividend was in the form of Islands Edison stock certificates. Distribution of dividends in kind in
liquidation was not considered a taxable event. Therefore any appreciation on the property distributed
was not taxable.
44. General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 202.
45. Id. at 200.
46. Id.
47. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 82 n.3 (describing the early Treasury regulations that set forth
the nontaxability of in-kind dividends).
48. Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); see infra Part II.C.
49. General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 206.
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50

ground. However, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue because of the
51
commissioner’s failure to raise it below. Although many repeal advocates
could forgive the Supreme Court for allowing a corporation to avoid taxes in
circumstances in which it simply distributed the property to shareholders as
dividends without directing them to immediately sell the property, they could
see no justification for the Court’s decision to allow General Utilities to avoid a
52
tax simply by distributing the asset first and then selling it.
As will become clear, General Utilities itself was not actually an application
of the doctrine that existed at the time of its repeal in 1986. General Utilities
53
was not liquidating. Rather, it was simply ridding itself of a single asset. Only
liquidating corporations were ultimately allowed to avail themselves of tax-free
54
distribution-then-sale of appreciated assets.
C. The Supreme Court’s Subsequent Refinement of General Utilities
In what would seem like an about-face, the Supreme Court decided
55
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co. a mere ten years after General Utilities.
Similar to the circumstances in General Utilities, Court Holding owned an
56
appreciated asset that it wished to sell. The corporation, though, began
57
negotiations and agreed in principle to a sale of the asset. At the eleventh
hour, the corporation’s attorney advised its manager–shareholders that the
corporation would incur a significant capital-gains tax liability if the sale went
58
forward as planned. As a result, the corporation immediately distributed the
asset to its two shareholders in kind, who made the sale on practically identical
59
terms. The Supreme Court found that the corporation obviously contracted to
make the sale, despite the midnight formalism that the shareholders carried out
60
to avoid the tax liability on the appreciation of the asset. The head- and chinscratching began anew since it seemed as though General Utilities and Court
Holding were practically identical fact situations but had widely divergent
outcomes. In fact, the Court even announced a test for this very situation: The
determination of whether a corporation should be taxed should be decided
61
based upon “substance” of the transaction. At the time Court Holding was

50. Helvering v. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co., 74 F.2d 972, 976 (4th Cir. 1935).
51. General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 206.
52. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 82 (describing the grounds that were ultimately upheld in Court
Holding as “out-of-bounds” and criticizing that result).
53. General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 202.
54. See infra Part II.D; supra note 35.
55. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 331 (1945).
56. Id. at 333.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 334.
61. Id.
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decided, this test seemed at least generally reasonable and balanced the
concerns many had about allowing these distribution-then-sales to occur to
avoid corporate-level tax. It might be that the Court was already turning against
General Utilities, or it could simply have been that the Court in General Utilities
did not reach the question of whether the structured distribution-then-sale of
appreciated assets would be taxable to the corporation.
Five years after Court Holding, the Supreme Court decided Commissioner
63
v. Cumberland Public Service Co., whose facts were somewhat different than
64
the prior cases. The Cumberland Public Service Company was liquidating itself
65
and wanted to sell various assets to a competitor. The competitor apparently
refused to purchase the assets directly from the company. Therefore, as a part
of winding up its operations, it distributed the assets to its shareholders as
66
67
dividends in kind. The shareholders then sold the assets to the competitor.
The facts of Cumberland would seem to place it right in the ambiguity that
reigned after Court Holding. The Supreme Court, applying the Court Holding
test, decided that when the corporation could not have made the sale at all, the
68
distribution-and-sale of the assets would not be taxable to the corporation.
After Cumberland, there was no obvious conclusion as to exactly how various
corporate distributions should be treated for tax purposes. Under General
Utilities, it seemed that a distribution-then-sale would be tax free, but under
69
Court Holding, such a transaction would be taxed. And, of course, the
economic-substance-of-the-transaction test seemingly announced in Court
Holding added little clarification. Cumberland’s reasoning was straightforward,
but the situation seemed very specific: The corporation would only be allowed
to effect a distribution-then-sale tax free when it simply could not sell the assets
70
on its own. Further, Cumberland created even more tension in the doctrine by
raising the question of whether the Supreme Court in Cumberland was blessing
General Utilities in the liquidation context but not in other contexts or whether
71
it had simply applied the test it announced in Court Holding. It was not until
almost ten years later that Congress acted to sort out how it wanted to tax

62. Indeed, one commentator argued that focusing on the Court Holding test would be preferable
to repealing the doctrine altogether. Beck, supra note 10, at 670.
63. Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
64. Essentially, Cumberland was selling all of its assets and ceasing to operate as a corporation.
This is the context in which Congress ultimately decided that General Utilities was most useful to
businesses. I.R.C. § 336 (1954).
65. Cumberland, 338 U.S. at 452–53.
66. Id. at 453.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 453–54.
69. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 331 (1945); General
Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 200 (1935).
70. Cumberland, 338 U.S. at 451.
71. See Kahng, supra note 4, at 1089 (describing the disparate holdings of Cumberland and Court
Holding as a tension in the doctrine).
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72

corporate distributions of appreciated assets.

D. Codification and Limitation of the Doctrine by Congress
In 1954, Congress sought to clear up the confusion about the tax effects of
73
various types of corporate distributions. As scholars have noted, most believed
74
that Congress would do away with General Utilities or codify it. In codifying
the doctrine, though, Congress apparently decided that the scope of General
Utilities should be even greater than the Court found in Court Holding. The sale
of any appreciated assets, not just those distributed and then sold, to any party
within a year of a company’s complete liquidation would avoid taxation at the
75
corporate level. In essence, the holding of Cumberland was extended to
include all situations in which a company was liquidated, not just situations in
76
which the buyer would not accept sale from the liquidating corporation. The
end result of Congress’s codification was to allow corporations to avoid taxation
on an asset’s appreciation via a distribution to and sale by shareholders or
77
simply any sale within a year in this liquidation context.
Nonetheless, Congress apparently did not intend for corporations who were
not winding down their operations to take advantage of the General Utilities
78
doctrine. Such was the basis of the tension that one early commentator called
79
the “central distortion” of tax law. Congress apparently believed that in the
context of liquidation—when a company distributed all remaining cash
including cash resulting from the sale of appreciated assets—there would always
80
be a receiving shareholder to tax. Indeed, in every circumstance of corporate
distribution of assets, there was always a shareholder who was taxed on the
increase in wealth resulting from the distribution, whether in-kind or in cash.
Further, Congress apparently perceived a certain wisdom to allowing
81
corporations to structure liquidations this way. Indeed, liquidation is an
82
“extraordinary” event in the life of a corporation. It is the point at which the
distinction between the corporation and its owners is least visible. At the very
moment the corporation ceases to exist, all remaining cash from the sales of its
assets is distributed to the corporation’s owners. Nonetheless, many scholars
and politicians persistently believed that double taxation was necessary.
72. See Shores, supra note 12, at 179 (describing Congress’s decision to codify General Utilities in
1954).
73. Id.
74. Wolfman, supra note 9, at 82.
75. I.R.C. § 336 (1954).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The codification only allowed the General Utilities–style distribution-and-sale or any sale to be
affected tax free as a part of a plan for “full liquidation” of the company. Id.
79. Wolfman, supra note 9, at 82.
80. See Shores, supra note 12, at 179 n.16 (explaining that if the company is in liquidation, the
distributed assets will “become subject to a shareholder-level tax”).
81. WOOD, supra note 13, at 8.
82. Shores, supra note 12, at 208.
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A brief example can illustrate how the postcodification doctrine functioned.
Suppose a corporation, Enterprise, Inc., purchased 100 shares of Consolidated,
Inc. in 2002 for $10,000. The CEO perused Consolidated’s financial statements,
but did not do that much work in assessing the risk. The board of directors did
not pay attention because it was a small sum of money and because the board
generally deferred to management. In the financial crisis of 2008, Consolidated
made a fortune by buying credit default swaps and its stock has been on the rise
ever since. Its market price is now $1,000,000. The CEO wants to sell the stock,
but realizes that Enterprise would realize a $990,000 gain on the sale of the
asset. Under the codified General Utilities doctrine, it would not matter whether
the CEO sold the stock on the open market or distributed the stock to the
shareholders with arrangements for them to sell it instead. Enterprise would
owe taxes on the gain. However, if Enterprise found itself in liquidation, it
could sell the stock (with all kinds of assets) within one year and avoid the taxes
on the $990,000 increase over the value it paid.
With this in mind, it seems arbitrary to tax in one circumstance while not
taxing in another. The same stock with the same appreciation in value is taxed
twice if Enterprise remains a going concern but is only taxed once if it
liquidates. On the other hand, at the point when the corporation is liquidating
and the shareholders are set to receive whatever cash is left over after all the
assets are sold and creditors are paid, the tax the corporation must pay with its
last breath is really paid by the stockholders, not the now-dissolved corporation.
III
THE DEBATE SURROUNDING REPEAL
A. The Rest of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
83

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the most recent major overhaul of the
American system of income taxation. Despite significant complexity, the Act
was primarily concerned with reducing individual income-tax rates, broadening
the income-tax base, and eliminating some of the more peculiar (and sometimes
84
nonsensical) tax contraptions of the twentieth century. To many scholars and
85
tax reformers, General Utilities fell into this third category. Congress wanted to
remove many of these provisions because they created unnecessary complexity
in the Code and because they led to arbitrarily constructed and tax-driven
transactions that resulted in special advantages for sophisticated businesses with
83. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
84. For example, throughout the 1900s, individual income taxes were as high as ninety-one percent
on the highest income earners. With such incredibly high marginal rates, taxpayer unrest was always
assuaged with numerous loopholes, deductions, and various methods for avoiding some of the Code’s
highest historical rates.
85. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86 (describing one of the driving forces behind repeal, the ALI
FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, supra note 33, as a “simplifying and elegant reform” that would
bring “coherence” to the tax code).
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86

expensive tax counsel. Given this landscape, it was not surprising that General
87
88
Utilities found its way to the chopping block. Scholars and politicians lined up
to express their displeasure with General Utilties’ contribution to the Code’s
89
complexity and to its seemingly arbitrary reprieve from the “classical” doubletax system. Furthermore, General Utilities was decidedly on the wrong side of
90
the goal of broadening the tax base.
There was one peculiarity to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 with respect to
corporate taxation: The reduction in personal income taxes resulted in, for the
first time in history, lower personal income-tax rates than corporate income-tax
91
rates. For all those who saw General Utilities as an affront against the
traditional system of double taxation, a corporate tax rate higher than the
individual rate would make no difference: they believed both individuals and
92
corporations should be taxed either way. Strangely, given the historical
justification of the double tax, a corporate rate higher than the personal one
93
would eliminate that justification.
There was no longer a distinct tax
advantage to operating as a C-corporation vis-a-vis operating as a
proprietorship, partnership, or some other type of pass-through corporate
94
entity.
B. Double Taxation or Integration?
As previously discussed, the double-tax system had clearly taken root in
American corporate tax law during the twentieth century. However, over time
there were always a few who thought that corporations should not be taxed at
95
all. At the time of the tax reform in 1986, these people were known as
96
“integrationists.” President Reagan himself seemed to be an integrationist,

86. Lobenhofer, supra note 16, at 168.
87. See, e.g., Wolfman, supra note 9, at 81 (questioning why the doctrine existed).
88. See Lobenhofer, supra note 16, at 169 (summarizing some of the legislative history surrounding
repeal).
89. Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86.
90. Block, supra note 3, at 308.
91. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
92. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86 (describing the double taxation of corporate income as
“classical”).
93. Shores, supra note 12, at 190.
94. Small and medium-sized businesses that do not plan to seek capital investment through access
to public capital markets may organize as entities that have the same limited liability as corporations
but are relieved of the double tax by “passing income through” the entity to its shareholders, usually
limited to a certain number.
95. See Anthony Polito, Constructive Dividend Doctrine from an Integrationist Perspective, 27
AKRON TAX J. 1, 2 (2012) (describing the term integrationist and the “Integrationist Norm,” which is
that corporate income should only be taxed once).
96. This is because they believed that the tax framework for individual people should be
“integrated” with the tax framework for corporations. Corporations are nothing but a group of people
operating in a different form, so the integrationists believed that practically all corporations should be
pass-through entities.
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stating that he saw little justification for any tax on corporations and that taxes
for corporate income should simply fall to the shareholders when they received
97
income from their ownership stake. Nonetheless, scholars suggested that even
integrationists should agree that the system under General Utilities represented
a partially integrated system, and that those who could benefit from the partial
integration was simply the result of how well their counsel could splice together
98
General Utilities with other doctrines to avoid tax.
C. Academic Criticism of General Utilities
The primary academic criticism of General Utilities is that it seems to be an
99
arbitrary and dogmatic tax break for corporations. After all, an ordinary
distribution of an appreciated asset would be required to be reported as a gain,
100
while the same gain would not be reported in liquidation. Beyond this
superficial complaint that the doctrine was arbitrary, the doctrine troubled
scholars because it was a way for corporations to avoid double taxation, which
had come to be accepted as a permanent feature of income taxation, and
101
because it led to what many saw as an above-optimal level of acquisitions.
Tax scholars of the 1980s no longer saw double taxation as a proposition to
prevent opportunistic taxpayers from paying a lower tax simply by virtue of
operating as a corporation. They saw double taxation as the “classical” system
102
for taxation of corporations and their shareholders. In effect, repealing
General Utilities was, to these scholars, the choice to operate a double-tax
system between corporations and shareholders, rather than one of single tax.
Simply put, they found it unfair that a corporation in liquidation could escape
paying taxes on sales and distributions of appreciated property while
103
corporations continuing to operate could not.
Another major academic complaint about General Utilities was the
economic effects of allowing liquidating corporations to avoid payment of taxes
on distributions of assets while disallowing going concerns the same
104
opportunity. As has been noted, there are a number of ways that a
105
corporation wishing to buy another may effect such a transaction. For the
sake of simplicity, the acquiring corporation may simply buy the stock of the
target corporation and exert control over the assets that way, or it may arrange
the transaction so that the target corporation liquidates itself and then sells all
97. See Block, supra note 3, at 308, n.8 (citing Corporate Tax Upsets Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1982, at D1, col. 3) (describing Reagan’s criticism of the tax system).
98. Wolfman, supra note 9, at 85–86.
99. Id.
100. I.R.C. § 336 (2006).
101. See Kahng, supra note 4, at 1087 (explaining the concern among many about how much
acquisition activity was occurring in the 1980s).
102. See, e.g.,Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86.
103. Id. at 85.
104. Id.
105. See supra Part II.B.
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the assets to the acquiring corporation. Under the General Utilities doctrine, an
acquiring corporation who purchased control of the target corporation via
106
purchasing stock would now own the appreciated assets. If, however, the
acquiring corporation used the second option, it could effect a step up of the
107
asset basis to its fair market value much more simply. If an asset was stepped
up every time it moved out of one corporation and into another, no corporation
would ever have to pay taxes on the gain. This ultimately made appreciated
assets more valuable to an acquirer than they were to the going concern that
108
was currently operating them, thus increasing merger and takeover activity.
More disconcerting to the academic proponents of General Utilities’ repeal was
that the second scenario could occur perpetually as long as the doctrine held
109
sway. Every time an asset was stepped up, the government lost the
110
opportunity to tax the accumulated gain at the corporate level. In addition to
a general belief that General Utilities was dissonant with double taxation of
corporate income, the perception that General Utilities was contributing to an
abnormally high level of takeovers led many to believe General Utilities repeal
111
should be a piece of tax reform in 1986.
D. Congressional Reports
The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 tracks the academic
arguments in favor of repeal rather closely. The staff of the Senate Finance
Committee generated a report that concluded that corporations are getting an
unreasonably favorable deal by being able to perpetually step up asset values
under General Utilities and that the general goals of the corporate income tax
112
were not being served by allowing General Utilities nonrecognition.
The report of the House Ways and Means Committee on the proposed
legislation also echoed the academy’s concerns about the apparently perverse
incentive for acquiring corporations to liquidate target corporations to avoid tax
106. Under another doctrine, known as the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine, acquiring companies could
step up the assets to fair market value regardless of whether they purchased the stock or the assets
directly. However, if the assets were purchased directly, the seller would owe taxes on the built in gain
unless it could avail itself of General Utilities. If it purchased the stock, the stock would reflect the
increased value of the assets and therefore would result in higher taxes for shareholders. Scholars did
not particularly like this doctrine either, but its combination with General Utilities was especially
deplorable because it allowed corporations to effectively avoid ever paying taxes on asset
appreciations. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 84.
107. In essence, the price of the stock of the target corporation would be more expensive if tax was
required on the appreciation. This led to an incentive to liquidate with General Utilities rather than
simply buy the stock and use the step up provided under Kimbell-Diamond.
108. Kahng, supra note 4, at 1092.
109. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86 (explaining that “dead” corporations have effectively avoided
tax for their entire lives).
110. Id. Furthermore, when you factor in Kimbell-Diamond step ups, an asset may go through its
life without ever being taxed. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 85 (discussing how corporations can avoid
tax when assets are at a stepped-up basis).
111. Kahng, supra note 4, at 1093.
112. See Beck, supra note 10, at 678–79 (describing the report of the Senate Finance Committee).

2 EDWARDS (DO NOT DELETE)

Nos. 3 & 4 2013]

3/19/2014 11:37 AM

THE REPEAL OF GENERAL UTILITIES

381

113

through General Utilities. The committee thought it was important “that the
Code should not artificially encourage corporate liquidations and acquisitions”
and that “repeal of . . . General Utilities . . . is a major step” towards slowing
114
down the merger activity of the 1980s. Like many scholars, the Ways and
Means Committee was concerned that General Utilities “undermine[d] the
115
corporate income tax.” The Committee noted the same concern that
corporations could step up the basis of acquired assets through a General
Utilities sale and perpetually avoid recognition of accumulated gains on various
116
assets. Notably absent from the committee report is an explicit declaration
that General Utilities is a natural enemy of the double tax. Though limiting
takeover activity was apparently a normative goal for Congress and it appeared
to believe that the perpetual step up in gain was an improper gratuity to
117
corporations, it did not explain its rationale for the latter conclusion. Despite
Congress’s conclusive stance and the practically unanimous academic chorus of
118
repeal, some voices in the wilderness urged Congress to think twice.
E. In Defense of General Utilities
Most of the defenses of General Utilities around the time of its repeal were
119
rooted in path dependence. Repealing General Utilities would result in a
120
“shock wave,” noted one commentator. By 1984, two things were clear to
most defenders of General Utilities: first, it probably would be repealed and
second, there would need to be a number of relief provisions and other various
121
workarounds to mitigate some of the repeal’s negative consequences.
Both the Senate Finance Committee in 1984 and the House Ways and
Means Committee in 1985 had apparently decided that repeal of General
Utilities was a favorable and proper course of action. However, the underlying
rationale for their recommendations seemed shaky at best and theoretically
122
untenable at worst. Although many arguments in favor of retaining General
Utilities acknowledged Congress’s queasiness with respect to acquisitions as an
123
underlying reason for repeal, they generally suggest that the cure would be
124
worse than the disease.
113. H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 281–82 (1985).
114. Id. at 282.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Beck, supra note 10, at 667.
119. See Block, supra note 3, at 308 (explaining that given the many years that General Utilities has
been a major fixture in the corporate tax landscape, there would be some “discomfort” among the tax
bar with its repeal).
120. Id. at 309.
121. Id.
122. See Beck, supra note 10, at 663 (stating that the proposals for repeal would create more
problems).
123. Block, supra note 3, at 324.
124. Beck, supra note 10, at 663–64.
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In the first place, arguing that General Utilities was unfairly generous to
corporations necessarily implies that a tax on a corporation’s shareholders
125
exclusively, rather than a tax on both, is fundamentally “overgenerous.”
126
However, there is very little traditional justification for a true double tax. The
early Treasury regulations did not consider in-kind distributions as realization
events, and ample legislative and other administrative history shows that, as a
general proposition, simply moving assets in and out of the corporate form is
127
not something that the income tax is supposed to touch. In essence, it appears
that the academic arguments for repeal flowed only from a value judgment that
taxing practically every transaction involving a corporation twice is appropriate.
128
Furthermore, history tends to fall on the side of taxation at only one level.
Double taxation is a later tax innovation that was grafted upon a system never
129
built to handle it.
As a practical matter, repealing General Utilities seems even more
problematic. The crux of the arguments against repeal was the nature of
130
131
circumstances in which assets moved in and out of the corporate form. The
scholars were clearly contemplating situations in which new ownership was
using General Utilities to circumvent taxes on gains that occurred under old
132
ownership of any given set of assets. However, many occurrences involve
133
assets moving in and out of various corporate forms by the same owners. In
those circumstances, a person simply moving an asset out of the corporate form
will have to pay a tax on any appreciation that occurs while the asset lived
under a corporate form rather than a pass-through form. Such a “toll” for
134
moving your own asset in and out of a corporation is problematic. The
fundamental basis of any economic argument for General Utilities was that it did
not let the Tax Code get in the way of the goal of lining up assets with their
most efficient uses. If there are awkward tax barriers between various forms,
135
this goal is harmed. Surely, those making this argument were making an
implied or subconscious distinction between the different types of enterprises
125. Id. at 669.
126. See Shores, supra note 12, at 177 (stating that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the
justification for double taxation).
127. Beck, supra note 10, at 672–73 (1985).
128. See supra Part III.B (discussing the integrationists and proponents of double tax).
129. See Shores, supra note 12, at 189–90 (explaining that the double tax was not originally intended
to be as broad as it is currently).
130. These circumstances did not always include transactions, which are considered bargained-for
agreements for transfer of property between two unrelated parties. These situations are usually thought
of as taxable circumstances since there are two unrelated parties. However, oftentimes the same owners
would be changing their holdings from assets themselves to stock in a corporation that held those
assets, and vice versa.
131. Beck, supra note 10, at 672–73.
132. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 84 (discussing “purchasers” who used General Utilities to avoid
tax on later sales of the same assets to other parties).
133. Beck, supra note 10, at 673.
134. Id. at 674.
135. Id. at 673.
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that operated as separately-taxable C-corporations. Some corporations are
large, have operations throughout the world, employ thousands of people, and
have thousands of diverse shareholders who are truly disconnected from the
operation of the business. This is the circumstance where the fictional corporate
person seems the most real or separately alive. However, there were many Ccorporations that were owned by one, two, or twenty people, many of whom
were involved in or close to the operation of the corporation. In this case, the
fictional corporate form seems much less distinct from these owners. These
people tended to move assets in and out of the corporate form or even change
operating form altogether. The justification for taxing both the corporate body
and the shareholders that represent its backbone is much weaker for these
closely held C-corporations.
The liquidation context, in particular, is one in which the double tax can
sting all the more painfully. The earlier example of Enterprise, Inc. can serve to
illustrate this. Enterprise has shareholders who own rights to the corporation’s
assets through stock. Say the CEO has haphazardly managed the company and
run it into the ground. The company will have to liquidate and will cease to
exist in the corporate form. Nonetheless, it has valuable assets, such as its stock
in Consolidated, Inc. Under a non–General Utilities regime, the corporation
would have to pay taxes on all the gains that occurred while the assets existed in
corporate form, right before the corporation ceased to exist. Functionally,
though, the tax that the corporation owed would ultimately be borne by the
shareholders, generally by a lower amount of distribution to them after the
136
liquidation. This is not just a double tax, one on the corporation and one on
the shareholders, but rather a double tax on the shareholders by themselves.
The corporation that technically held the assets while they appreciated is no
longer alive. Yet, without General Utilities, it is forced to pay taxes. Of course,
one prominent scholar would respond to these voices in the wilderness by
imploring you not to pity the poor, dead corporation, because it probably spent
137
its life . . . avoiding taxes.
IV
IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF REPEAL AND CALLS FOR REINSTATEMENT
A. Effects on Taxpayers
Although by now most taxpayers have adjusted their strategies to account
for the repeal of General Utilities, the short term was more difficult. As argued
prior to repeal, those hardest hit were small businesses whose owners placed

136. See Beck, supra note 10, at 674 (“As soon as the tax is measured, it will fall upon the
shareholders either as a reduction of their liquidation proceeds or as their direct obligation.”).
137. See Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86 (“[T]he decedent corporation is one that managed quite
successfully to maneuver through its corporate existence without paying tax on real income that
accrued during its ownership of the appreciating assets.”).
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their assets in the corporate form for many years prior to liquidation.
In
addition to making liquidation more costly, and thereby deterring those who
scholars might have wished to prevent from availing themselves of General
139
Utilities, the repeal also caught many small businesses in the process. Even
more telling is that big, sophisticated corporations were not the ones most
140
acutely affected. Large corporations are rarely in liquidation and they can
avoid gains during acquisitions using other tools and tax provisions aside from
141
General Utilities. Smaller corporations, though, are less immune to changing
142
business cycles and other social problems. Owners of small corporations are
more likely to be very few in number and to move their assets in and out of the
corporate form from time to time. Given the new tax on moving assets around
in this way, it would follow logically that smaller corporations would be
143
disproportionately hit. Furthermore, for those who had the misfortune of
being a C-corporation before General Utilities repeal and who later wished to
re-form as a different type of entity, they would owe taxes on long-term
appreciation of their assets, while an enterprise re-forming itself from one type
144
of noncorporation to another will not. This tends to “trap” assets in corporate
forms where they may not be as efficiently used or leave the owner with a tax
burden in trying to change the form of her small business. It is more difficult to
pity the thousands of disparate shareholders of a corporate giant, who are
probably diversified and may not even notice the last-gasp tax they will have to
pay. However, in a small corporation, the backbone shareholders will surely
notice. Again, the corporate form does not seem as separate from shareholders
in the context of a small corporation as it does in the context of a giant like WalMart. Of course, immediately following repeal of General Utilities, there was a
marked increase in small businesses formed and re-formed as pass-through
entities because of the built-in tax advantages and the ease with which assets
145
can move in and out of those forms. The C-corporation is now the province of
146
only the largest operations and a few others who have other tax strategies.
Aside from repeal’s apparent mistreatment of small business owners, it
147
created new problems in the market for corporate control. Even though
General Utilities repeal had ushered in a new era of tax neutrality with respect
138. Lobenhofer, supra note 16, at 174.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 175–76.
141. Id.
142. See id. (explaining the classic case of the “family business” when the business splits up because
of family pressures, related or unrelated to the operation of the business).
143. Id. One cannot imagine Wal-Mart distributing all its assets to shareholders and then trying to
operate as a pass-through entity such as a partnership.
144. Beck, supra note 10, at 673.
145. WOOD, supra note 13, at 8.
146. Other tax issues may include avoiding the alternative minimum tax, another historical tax
contraption, or those who simply pay themselves salaries as managers rather than distributing dividends
to themselves as owners.
147. See generally Kahng, supra note 4, at 1087 (questioning whether repeal was wise).
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to acquisitions, it brought with it a troubling mismatch in corporate control.
Whereas prior to General Utilities repeal there had been an incentive to take
over companies and operate their assets more efficiently, there was now an
incentive to allow underutilized assets to sit on the books of unnecessarily
149
bloated companies. Whatever victory may be claimed from slowing down
150
merger activity following repeal of General Utilities, there was now another
problem: stagnation. With new taxes complicating the free flow of assets in and
out of various corporate forms, firms had a tendency to hold onto entire
businesses that would not be as efficient under their control as they would be
151
under someone else’s. Even if repeal was the right decision at the time, there
are strong arguments for reviving, at the very least, some of the policy
underlying General Utilities.
B. Did Repeal Achieve Any of its Goals?
The proponents of double taxation pretty clearly achieved their goal of
broadening the scope of double taxation. General Utilities met its end and
almost all gains and losses on distributed assets, with few exceptions, were now
considered reportable events. Whether the policy underlying double taxation of
corporate income is proper or not, the repeal of General Utilities certainly
reiterated the preference among many for a double-tax regime. To be sure, the
reformers had achieved their goal of reducing the arbitrariness of the tax
152
treatment of corporate distributions. Once again, all were taxed.
There is little evidence that the practical goal of some scholars of reducing
153
merger activity was ever realized. Although merger activity slowed slightly in
1986and 1987 following the repeal of General Utilities, it increased to heights
154
above pre-repeal levels in 1988 and 1989. In addition to the little evidence that
supports the theory that repeal slowed down or stopped inefficient merger
activity, there is some evidence that it might have prevented some efficient
155
merger activity. According to one commentator, the question never should
have been whether the total takeover activity was too great, but rather whether
156
the amount of inefficient takeovers were too great. Only after that question is
addressed can policy be properly developed to limit the inefficient transactions
while not inhibiting efficient ones.

148. Id.
149. See id. at 1097 (explaining that acquisitions are a natural way to punish corporate managers by
taking assets away from those who are not efficiently utilizing them).
150. See part IV.B for discussion on how General Utilities may not have slowed down merger
activity.
151. Kahng, supra note 4, at 1097.
152. Shores, supra note 12, at 195.
153. Id. at 181.
154. Id.
155. Kahng, supra note 4, at 1110.
156. See id. at 1116 (criticizing lawmakers for recognizing only the undesirable aspect of takeover
activity).
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V
GENERAL UTILITIES AS A TURNING POINT IN TAX LAW HISTORY
Repeal of General Utilities was considered one of the “sea changes” in the
157
life of many tax practitioners who practiced in the 1980s. Before General
Utilities, the landscape of corporate liquidations and the natural flow of assets
that went along with them were vastly different. Under the single, shareholder
tax regime that existed under the codified General Utilities doctrine, assets
could move in and out of the corporate form with relative ease, at least from a
158
tax perspective. Shareholders of liquidating corporations were only subject to
tax on capital gains once, rather than having to pick up the tab for the dead
corporation as well. The law recognized the wisdom of nonrecognition in the
context of a company’s liquidation. Of course, repeal simplified the Code and
159
broadened the base of corporate taxation. It also further entrenched the
concept of double taxation.
Another notable effect of General Utilities repeal was a mass migration from
subchapter-C to subchapter-S corporations. Since assets moving from
subchapter-C or subchapter-S and back faced potential tax liability under a tax
code without General Utilities, many smaller businesses that might have
incorporated under Subchapter C opted instead to be an LLC or LLP. These
provisions of the Code probably mitigated some of the harshness of General
Utilities repeal.
The shift underlying General Utilities was more than just a change in the way
businesses do business. Despite the evidence of problems that arose from repeal
and the thin justification for the double tax, repeal of General Utilities was an
ebb away from a more integrated regime for corporate taxation. In truth, the
fight over General Utilities was not so much about economic theory, business
decisionmaking, or generating revenue. It was an ideological choice for double
taxation. Many believe that even in the context of liquidation, an extraordinary
160
event in the life cycle of a corporation, double taxation is still appropriate.
The policy underlying this reprieve from double taxation was based simply on
the belief that double taxation itself was a bad idea as much as it was a bad idea
in the liquidation context. Even today, the policy of double taxation is still up
161
for debate. Today, like in the early 1980s, tax reform is once again a real
162
possibility. And, again, broadening the tax base, that is, taxing more entities, is
163
one competing goal. On the other hand, limiting the effects of double taxation
157. WOOD, supra note 13, at 8.
158. See Lobenhofer, supra note 16, at 174 (explaining that the repeal of General Utilities created
more difficulty in moving assets from corporate to noncorporate forms).
159. See id. at 155 (explaining that reformers achieved their goal).
160. Wolfman, supra note 9, at 86.
161. See, e.g., Polito, supra note 95 (arguing for integration, yet admitting that it is likely politically
impractical).
162. Robert Pear, G.O.P. Talks of Limiting Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, at A15.
163. See Editorial, Flat Taxes and Angry Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011, at A20; see also Alan
Reynolds, Tax Rates, Inequality and the 1%, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2011 at A15 (representing the current
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on taxpayers is, as it has always been, a potential driver of new tax policy.
Indeed, the last major tax-reform event, the Bush Tax Cuts, involved mitigating
the effect of double taxation of corporate income through lowering rates on
165
capital gains and dividends. Whether for the sake of efficiency, fairness to the
consumer–investor, administrative simplicity, or even perhaps to encourage
repatriation of American tax dollars from cross-border tax havens, some of the
policy arguments regarding double taxation that underpinned General Utilities’
repeal could be considered by policymakers as they navigate the next potential
shift in the history of American income taxation.
VI
CONCLUSION
Tax policy, tax scholarship, tax theory, and tax practice all had different
ways of analyzing the issue of corporate distributions and sales of appreciated
assets. Over time, different value judgments over the efficacy of the double tax,
the desirability of various tax avoidance opportunities, and politicians’ affinity
for modifying taxpayer behavior through the Tax Code gave us a massive code
filled with all sorts of divergent provisions. The story of the General Utilities
doctrine is certainly no exception. It is not just a case of how to treat various
types of business activities under the tax law, but perhaps a microcosm for how
tax policy and philosophy ebb and flow over time. Beginning with the early
regulations from the Treasury to the ultimate repeal of the doctrine in 1986, the
life and death of General Utilities may be a microcosm for how scholarship,
politics, and business approach tax issues differently. Will the future hold a
return of General Utilities? Though this answer is doubtful, it is abundantly
clear that the General Utilities doctrine, and the tensions it represents, was a
major part of the history of federal income taxation in the United States.

themes and tones in tax policy).
164. See Polito, supra note 95, at 6.
165. Id.

